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Abstract
Health care provision is almost universally characterised by third party
purchasing in which the provider of healths e r v i c e si sr e i m b u r s e db ya na g e n c y
(public or private insurer), rather than the patient. We show how a purchaser
can manage the incentives that patient choice gives rise to by its own choice of
monitoring arrangement. Even though patients are ignorant about their exact
medical conditions and insulated from the costs of health care, they can help
alleviate incentive problems due to asymmetric information through the choices
that they make about whether to be treated. We show that if patients are
responsive to variations in treatment, it can be worthwhile to base payment
on the health outcome achieved rather than upon the treatment delivered.
Outcomes-based payments may also be preferable where services are supplied
by not-for-pro￿t agencies who are intrinsically concerned with patient welfare.
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11 Introduction
Health care provision is almost universally characterised by third party purchasing in
which the provider of health services is reimbursed by an agency (public or private
insurer), rather than the patient. In such cases it is imperative that purchasers
monitor suppliers directly since patients themselves are largely insulated from the
cost of the health care they consume. However, to the extent that quality of service
determines the willingness to consume, purchasers can rely on some demand-side
discipline imposed by patients. While it is well known that consumers can act as
monitors, we show that monitoring schemes diﬀer in their eﬀectiveness in utilizing
the disciplining role that patients play. In particular, we show that a health service
purchaser￿s choice of the monitoring arrangement may depend on the strength of
patients￿ demand response to variations in quality of service.
Following Arrow (1963) we consider that the knowledge of an individual patient
that is acquired by their physician goes beyond what can be described by the patient￿s
diagnosis and current health state. This asymmetric information is the source of the
incentive problem in our model. To induce providers to deliver appropriate treatment,
they will have to be given incentives to reveal their information correctly, which
necessitates paying them an informational rent. Payments based on the treatments
chosen by the health care supplier are commonplace and form the basis of some
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) payments in Medicare ￿ see McClellan (1997).
Payments based on health outcomes are made possible by the increasing information
that is being generated about the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent treatments ￿ information
that ￿ows from the outcomes movement which we brie￿yr e v i e wb e l o w￿a n da r e
becoming a reality1 as third party payers look to provide stronger incentives for health
1Examples of this form of payment are reported in the article ￿Florida Employers Will Oﬀer
2care delivery.
In our model treatment-based payments have the advantage that they place a
tighter constraint on the supplier￿s choice of treatment and therefore, ap r i o r i ,w o u l d
appear to be preferable. However, the analysis indicates that there is an important
role for the information that patients have regarding the nature of medical interven-
tions speci￿cally when patients use this information to decide whether to be treated.
With patients whose demand is responsive to treatment, a supplier who adjusts treat-
ment so as to elicit higher payment must do so in a way that will cause patients to
abstain from being treated. This abstention hurts the supplier and can best be ex-
ploited by a purchaser by making payment depend on outcomes. Hence, we conclude
that the greater is the demand response on the part of patients the more likely it is
for the purchaser to prefer outcome-based payment. A similar argument applies if
t h es u p p l i e ri sc o n c e r n e dper se with the treatment that they oﬀer, perhaps because
they are altruistic and value the health gain enjoyed by the patients that they treat.
Thus, a purchaser seeking to minimise the cost of health care must chose whether to
condition payment upon treatment or on health outcome, paying attention to how
these payments make use of patients￿ demand responses.
Our analysis implies that health outcomes data may be used diﬀerently depending
upon which medical conditions the health services being purchased are intended to
alleviate. In cases of emergency care and life threatening illness like cardiovascular
diseases where it is diﬃc u l tt ob e l i e v et h a tp a t i e n t sm a k ec h o i c e sa b o u tw h e t h e rt o
be treated, payment based on treatment provided is most likely to reduce costs. For
elective procedures and less severe illnesses, like ear infections and eczema, it is more
likely that purchasers will bene￿t from conditioning payment on health outcomes.
Incentives to Doctors￿ in the New York Times 16 November 2001.
3This is because responsiveness of patient demand is more likely to be an issue in
these cases, and outcome based payments make better use of demand responsiveness.
This approach also provides criteria to decide how to channel investment in outcomes
research: we establish a cost containment role for outcomes data and show that to
t h ee x t e n tt h a ti n c e n t i v es c h e m e sa ﬀect the cost of providing health care, additional
dollars spent on outcomes research will be more eﬀective in types of illness where
patient demand is responsive to treatment intensity.
The Outcomes Movement
The outcomes movement, which has also been referred to as the ￿Third Revolution
in Medical Care￿2 (Relman, 1988), has attracted substantial government funding3,
generated intense debate in the medical profession (Epstein, 1990, Naylor, 1995, and
Tanenbaum, 1993) and continues to be a major priority in medical research. The
movement has two distinct aspects. First, outcomes research considers how an indi-
vidual￿s health status, both prior to and following treatment can be measured4.T h i s
research has emphasized that health status is multi-dimensional and that measures
of health status vary from one medical condition to another. Second, the outcomes
movement is concerned with understanding the impact of diﬀerent treatments on im-
2According to Relman (1988), the ￿rst two ￿revolutions￿ are the expansion of health services (in
the 1940s and 1950s) and the movement to contain costs (in the 1980s).
3In 1989 the federal Agency for Health Care Policy Research was set up in the US, explicitly
committed to conduct and disseminate outcomes research. In the British National Health Service
outcomes research is central to the process of Clinical Audit (for which health providers receive a
speci￿c budget) and Evidence Based Medicine (Whynes, 1996).
4Published outcomes research provides many indications of this focus. For exam-
ple, papers from the Centre for Health Quality, Outcomes and Economic Research
(http://dcc2.bumc.bu.edu/chqoer/about.htm) contain the following: ￿Our objective was to develop
a patient-based measure of the severity of osteoarthritis of the knee focusing on symptomatology,
that may be used in conjunction with measures of health-related quality of life in monitoring the
health status of outpatients.￿ and ￿We developed a symptom-based measure of severity for chronic
lung disease(CLD) that can be readily administered in ambulatory care settings and be used to sup-
plement general health-related quality of life (HRQoL) assessments and pathophysiologic indicators
in research and clinical care.￿
4provements in health status5. This activity has centred on the collection and analysis
of large data sets where information on changes in health status, together with in-
formation on treatments undertaken is recorded and analysed. Proponents of this
research see it as establishing the proper basis for measuring medical output and,
hence, claim that it will ￿bring order and predictability￿ (Ellwood, 1988) to health
care systems. Such claims have a basis in economic analysis because if the outcomes
research program succeeds in isolating the medically eﬀective treatments for a range
of conditions, it will provide purchasers of health services with additional information
that can be used to better specify the reimbursement of health care suppliers. This
is the reason for our focus on the outcomes movement and our subsequent analysis
of payment mechanisms that might be derived from it.
Outcome measures, in the form of infection rates, morbidity rates and related
measures, are now routinely collated. The QALY ￿ a measure of the impact of
health care interventions on patient welfare ￿ is commonly used when discussing the
allocation of health care resources6. For example, Dranove (2000) reports, ￿...inter-
ventions that cost more than $60,000 per QALY are often deemed cost-ineﬀective￿.
He also points out that , ￿this threshold is considerably lower than the value of a year
of life identi￿ed by economic studies￿. As noted above the outcomes movement has
emphasized the multi-dimensional nature of many health care interventions so that a
single summary measure is questionable. Nevertheless it is possible that the concept
of the QALY may be re￿ned, or extended to many dimensions, such that there is
broad agreement that some such measure is an appropriate indication of the eﬀec-
5For example, Tanenbaum (1993) comments thus on the Medical Treatment Eﬀectiveness Pro-
gram: ￿This program diﬀers from earlier eﬀorts in its focus on medical eﬀectiveness and its spon-
sorship of large-scale statistical studies of both common and alternative treatments for speci￿c
conditions. It is a part of what has been called the ￿health-outcomes strategy￿￿.
6See Lu (1999).
5tiveness of a particular health care intervention. In which case it would correspond
to the outcome measure that we consider below.
Related papers
Central to our analysis is the concept of patients responding to the treatments
they are oﬀered by choosing where, or whether, to be treated. The idea that patients
who have a long term relationship with a physician, or who receive information from
friends, can be expected to choose where to be treated ￿ or in the case of elective
treatments whether to be treated at all ￿ has been an important aspect of the analysis
of health contracts. Previously, such a demand response on the part of patients has
been identi￿ed as an important incentive instrument in mitigating the eﬀects of moral
hazards which are perceived to lead to excessive cost and compromised quality of care.
Discussion has, in particular, focused on how payment based only on the number
of patients treated (price-quantity schedules) can be used to provide appropriate
incentives ￿ see for example Ma and McGuire (1997), Ma (1994), McGuire (2000) and
Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a, 1998b, 2000). In the US price quantity schedules are
inherent in the prospective payment system used by Medicare from 1983 and in the
UK health purchasers have been encouraged to adopt similar arrangements since the
early 1990s. In contrast, we ￿nd that demand eﬀects also help to align incentives by
reducing provider rents due to asymmetric information. But, more signi￿cantly, we
show that outcomes-based payment is more eﬀective than treatment-based payments7
7The seminal work by Maskin and Riley (1985) establishes the theoretical framework concerning
the choice of monitoring instruments in contracts with asymmetric information that is the foundation
of this paper. They show that input-based taxes are more eﬃcient than output-based taxes. More
recently Khalil and LawarrØe (1995) have shown that output-based schemes can be superior when
the agent receives a transfer. Lewis and Sappington (1995) and Bontems and Bourgeon (2000) are
other recent contributions to this literature. In contrast to these authors, we show how the choice
of instruments determines the eﬀectiveness of the monitoring role played by patients, which in turn
may determine the choice of the monitoring instrument itself. The central insight we oﬀer is that,
with asymmetric information, the choice of the payment scheme may depend on the responsiveness
of demand by patients.
6in utilizing patients￿ demand response.
Asymmetric information regarding patient types of the kind that we consider here
has featured in the work of Dranove (1987), Allen and Gertler (1991), Ma (1994),
and Ellis and McGuire (1986). In this literature the focus is upon the eﬀect of us-
ing a single payment to cover patients of diﬀerent types with a view to examining
the incentives generated by prospective payment systems as an alternative to cost
reimbursement in health care markets. In contrast to these papers, the present pa-
per considers how a purchaser may best ￿ne tune payments so as to ensure that
diﬀerent types of patients receive the kind of treatment that is eﬃcient for them.
The alternatives with a single payment covering multiple types are either that some
patients are not treated (or dumped in the terminology of Ma, 1994) or that suppli-
ers earn excessive pro￿ts by choosing to treat easier patients, a process referred to
as cream-skimming (see Barros, 2003). Without the information that it is provided
by outcomes research, a purchaser has little option but to choose between dumping
or cream skimming. Hence, our approach is predicated on purchasers having more
detailed information and considers how that information might best be used. Lewis
and Sappington (1999) adopt an approach that is similar to the one pursued in this
paper to address a diﬀerent question, that of how information acquisition by suppliers
aﬀects the form of the optimal contract.
The organization of the paper is as follows. A model of health service provision
with private information is presented in section 2. The optimal contract under full
information is derived in section 3. In sections 4 and 5, we study the case of treatment-
based and outcome-based payments, and compare the two in section 6, where the
main result of the paper is presented. We consider supplier altruism in section 7 and
discuss the results and their implications for health care policy in section 8.
72 The Model
We consider a purchaser who contracts with a single8 health care supplier, which for
convenience we refer to as the hospital, in order to ensure the provision of treatment
of patients with a particular medical condition and a given health status prior to
treatment.9 Patients may be one of two types, which we denote by φ ∈ {φg,φb}
where φg > φb.Whilst we restrict attention to a model with two types for expositional
simplicity, we show in the appendix how our results would easily generalize to a model
with multiple types. A patient of good type φg is assumed to respond well to treatment
a n db ec h e a pt ot r e a tw h e r e a st h eo p p o s i t ei sa s s u m e df o rbad type φb. The purchaser,
hospital and individuals all share the same ex ante assessment of the probability of
a patient￿s type, where Pr[φ = φg]=π and Pr[φ = φb]=1− π. An individual￿s
type depends on the precise nature of their condition as can be determined solely by
a physician, and is therefore unknown to either the purchaser or the individual. A
patient￿s type is, however, discovered by the hospital at the onset of treatment and,
hence, there is asymmetric information.
For each patient, the hospital determines an intensity of treatment10,w h i c hw e
denote by x. At y p e - φ patient given a treatment of intensity x will have a gain in
health status11 of h(x,φ) increasing in x and φ. The purchaser attaches a monetary
8We treat the hospital as a monopoly supplier and thus abstract from diﬃculties that arise when
several hospital suppliers compete for a contract.
9For the purposes of exposition we consider a medical condition of a given severity. In practice, a
contract could be written to cover both a diagnosis and severity of condition. Hence one diagnosis
could give rise to many conditions being contracted for.
10For convenience we consider treatment intensity as a scalar quantity. Intensity can also be
thought of as an index of a multidimensional vector that characterizes a particular medical inter-
vention. Provided that the diﬀerent dimensions of treatment occur in ￿xed proportions the analysis
is unaﬀected. When there are truly multi-dimensional aspects to a hospital￿s decisions then new
issues arise of the kind discussed in Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a).
11We treat h as a scalar and deterministic purely for convenience. It is straightforward to allow
for a vector of characteristics representing an individual￿s health status and for h to be a random
variable with density f(h|x,φ) .
8value v(h) t ot h eg a i ni nh e a l t hs t a t u sh, and the purchaser￿s bene￿ti sg i v e nb y
b(x,φ) ≡ v(h(x,φ)) We assume that b(x,φ) is increasing and concave in x, increasing
in φ and such that the marginal bene￿t of treatment is non-decreasing in φ. These
assumptions ensure that the purchaser￿s expected bene￿t function is well behaved and
meets the requirement that treatment is more eﬀective for good types. We assume
that the cost of treating a patient of type φ with intensity x can be written as c(x,φ)
and assume that c(.) is increasing and convex in x, decreasing in φ and that the
marginal cost of treatment is non-increasing in φ. Again, these assumptions ensure
that costs are well-behaved and meet the requirement of treatment being less costly
for good types.12 We assume that c(x,φ), which we take to be the true economic
cost of treatment, cannot be observed by the purchaser. This is consistent with, for
example, ￿nancial costs being observable but there being elements of cost that are not
reported and are private information to the hospital. We also assume the necessary
Inada conditions so that we obtain positive but bounded values for choice variables
at the optimum.
Our model of demand response by patients follows that of Ma and McGuire (1997)
and McGuire(2000). We assume that long-term relationships between hospitals and
patients or information from friends allows individuals to form an assessment of the
intensity of treatment that is on oﬀer from the hospital. Since more intense treatments
increase health status, patients will choose where to be treated, or in the case of
elective procedures whether to be treated at all, according to this assessment of
treatment intensity. We therefore assume that demand is a function of the intensity of
treatment that individuals expect13 and that individuals prior to their own treatment
12A c c o r d i n gt oo u ra s s u m p t i o n s ,w eh a v eac l e a rr a n k i n go ft y p e sa c c o r d i n gt og o o da n db a d
prospects. See Lewis and Sappington (1989) and Bontems and Bourgeon (2000) for a discussion of
the eﬀects of countervailing incentives in a related models.
13T h i s ,i nc o m m o nw i t hm u c ho ft h el i t e r a t u r eo nh e a l t hc o n t r a c t s ,p r e s u m e st h a tt h eh e a l t ht r e a t -
9have an unbiased signal of the average intensity of treatment they will receive if
treated. Hence, if good types are treated with intensity xg and bad types with
intensity xb each patient anticipates that they will receive treatment of expected
intensity ﬂ x = πxg +( 1− π)xb. We suppose that the total number of patients who
wish to be treated14 is an increasing function of expected intensity ﬂ x, and so denote
total expected demand15 for treatment as n(x(xg,x b)), with n0(ﬂ x) ≥ 0. The special
case in which n0 =0corresponds to patients who are either ignorant of the treatment
intensity that they will receive or cannot respond to changes in expected intensity,
e.g., because of medical emergencies. Since patients do not know their type, n(.) is
independent of φ.
We assume initially that the hospital operates ￿for pro￿t￿ but consider in section
7 the implications of the hospital having a concern for its patients. Since the hospital
observes patients￿ types it can choose treatments conditional on type. A treatment
policy for the hospital consists of a type contingent treatment intensity for each
patient which we write as {xg,x b}. The hospital￿s treatment policy determines both
the revenue and cost of each patient treated and expected demand.
Payment from the purchaser to the hospital depends on the patient￿s type as
reported by the hospital. Under what we call treatment-based payment, the purchaser
veri￿es that patients receive the treatment according to the types claimed. Under
what we call outcome-based payment, the purchaser veri￿es that patients￿ health-gains
ments being considered have the attributes of search goods. Our main results would be preserved if
we assumed that demand was determined by expected bene￿ts.
14This reduced form for demand can be rationalised by assuming that patients￿ utility depends
on expected treatment and improvement in health status, and belief about type and that they seek
treatment if utility is above a reservation value. Using a distribution of reservation values, there
would be demand that is a function of treatment intensity, belief about responsiveness of health
status to treatment and belief about patient type.
15Random demand together with the requirement to ensure that patients are not dumped, which is
formalized subsequently in individual rationality constraints, will make it infeasible to base penalties
on the number of patients treated.
10(i.e., the outcome) corresponds to the types claimed. We assume that the purchaser
can impose suﬃcient penalties such that the hospital will want to ensure that what
the purchaser observes is consistent with its claim. Hence, if a type φg patient is
claimed by the hospital to be type φb they will receive a treatment of intensity xbt
under treatment-based payment, whereas under outcomes-based payment, they will
receive treatment with an intensity that results in a health-gain equal to that of a
type φb patient. The hospital may thus misrepresent a patient￿s type if it is in its
interest to do so.16
To isolate the incentive eﬀects of each payment scheme we further assume that
payment is based on either treatment alone or on outcome alone but that the costs of
implementing payment are the same in each case. This is equivalent to assuming that
there is a ￿xed cost of setting up each monitoring system such that the purchaser must
choose whether to verify a hospital￿s claims in respect of either treatment or outcomes
because verifying both, and thus incurring two ￿xed costs, is prohibitively expensive.
In practice the ￿xed cost of establishing a system to verify outcomes may diﬀer from
the ￿xed cost of establishing a system to verify treatments, but the implications
a r eo b v i o u s . I fb o t ht r e a t m e n ta n do u t c o m ec o u l db eo b s e r v e di no u rm o d e l ,i ti s
equivalent to observing a patient￿s type, and the ￿rst best (net of veri￿cation cost)
can be implemented. In practice the purchaser-supplier relationship is complex so
that purchasers would not eliminate asymmetry of information even if they pursue
elements of both treatment and outcome veri￿cation. In practice purchasers may,
therefore, want to incorporate both in their reimbursement systems. Our analysis
acts as a guide to the relative merits of each payment system by focusing on the
16See Alger and Ma (2003) for references to the recent literature where agent￿s are assumed to be
"honest" with an exogenous probability. They show that the second best contract, which we rely
on, is optimal as long as this probability is not too large
11incentive eﬀects of one instrument at a time.
The timing of events that we assume is as follows. To start with, everyone has
symmetric belief about patient types. The purchaser designs a contract under which
the hospital will be rewarded for each person treated subject either to veri￿cation by
monitoring of treatments given or of outcomes achieved. Prior to receiving treatment,
individuals receive a signal (the average intensity of treatment) and decide on the basis
of that signal whether or not to be treated. Those deciding to be treated then go to the
hospital to receive treatment. Only the hospital learns the type of the patient prior to
oﬀering treatment. Following treatment by the hospital, the purchaser assesses either
the intensity of treatment that a patient undergoes or the outcome of treatment and
the hospital is then paid according to its contract with the purchaser.
3 Full Information
If there were full information on patient types, the purchaser could condition payment
directly on a patient￿s type. Then the purchaser￿s objective function17 is
n(ﬂ x)
£
π
¡
b(xg,φg) − pg
¢
+( 1− π)(b(xb,φb) − pb)
⁄
, (1)
where pg, pb denote transfers paid by the purchaser for, respectively, good and bad
type patients. The purchaser needs to ensure that the hospital is willing to provide
the necessary treatment to each type and so must ensure that the hospital makes
a non-negative return on each type of patient to avoid ￿dumping￿18.W e t h e r e f o r e
17For expositional simplicity we assume that the purchaser is concerned with the health gains of
patients but does not attach any weight to the hospital￿s pro￿t. Our qualitative results are preserved
if the ￿cost of public funds￿ approach, as in Laﬀont and Tirole (1993), is used instead.
18See Lewis and Sappington (1999) and Ma (1994) for more on dumping and cream skimming.
McClellan (1997) provides evidence that diagnostic related groups (DRG) are often de￿ned to ac-
commodate exceptional cases with high treatment cost in order to avoid dumping.
12assume that the optimal contract will satisfy the individual rationality constraints:
pg − c(xg,φg) ≥ 0, (IRg)
pb − c(xb,φb) ≥ 0. (IRb)
The purchaser￿s problem is to maximize the objective function (1) subject to IRg
and IRb. Since in (1) any transfer that the purchaser makes to the hospital subtracts
from its welfare, the two constraints are binding, and we can substitute for pg and pb
and solve for an unconstrained optimum19. To simplify notation, we de￿ne expected
surplus per patient as
S(xg,x b)
def = π
¡
b(xg,φg) − c(xg,φg)
¢
+( 1− π)(b(xb,φb) − c(xb,φb)) (2)
and write the purchaser￿s objective function as
W(xg,x b)
def = n(ﬂ x)S(xg,x b). (3)
Denoting partial derivatives by subscripts and the derivative of demand with respect
to average intensity by n0,t h e￿rst best treatment intensities are the solutions to the
following ￿rst order conditions:
Wg(x
∗
g,x
∗
b)=n
0(ﬂ x
∗)S(x
∗
g,x
∗
b)+n(ﬂ x
∗)
£
bx(x
∗
g,φg) − cx(x
∗
g,φg)
⁄
=0 , (4)
Wb(x
∗
g,x
∗
b)=n
0(ﬂ x
∗)S(x
∗
g,x
∗
b)+n(ﬂ x
∗)[bx(x
∗
b,φb) − cx(x
∗
b,φb)] = 0, (5)
19The program de￿ned by maximizing (1) subject to IRg and IRb is assumed to be well behaved
with a unique optimum. In the absence of the function n(.), concavity of b(.) and convexity of c(.)
would ensure a well-behaved program. However, an increase in treatment increases demand and
if this eﬀect is strong enough, we could have an unbounded solution. Therefore, we are assuming
that the properties of n(.) do not invalidate the convexity of the program implied by standard
assumptions on the functions b(.) and c(.).
13where ﬂ x∗ denotes ﬂ x evaluated at ￿rst best treatment intensities. These two conditions
illustrate the eﬀects of demand on optimal treatment intensities. Since demand is
increasing in treatment intensities, the ￿rst-best intensity of treatment for each type
is extended beyond that which makes marginal bene￿t equal marginal cost for a given
patient. The extent of this excess of treatment (over that which would prevail in
the absence of patients responding to treatment intensity by demanding treatment)
is captured by the terms involving n0. The ￿rst order conditions also make clear,
given our assumptions on b(.) and c(.), that a good type will receive more intensive
treatment than a bad type in the ￿rst best, i.e. x∗
g >x ∗
b.
For future reference it is useful to note that, with n00 ≤ 0, the cross partial
Wgb(x∗
g,x ∗
b) is negative. This follows because an increase in the treatment inten-
sity oﬀered to bad types decreases average surplus S(.) and reduces the value on
the margin from treating good types, since the net marginal bene￿ti sn e g a t i v e
(
£
bx(x∗
g,φg) − cx(x∗
g,φg)
⁄
< 0,) at the ￿r s tbe s tt r e a t m e n t .B ys y m m e t r y ,Wbg(x∗
g,x ∗
b) <
0 and the same argument applies.
4 Treatment-based payment
We now consider asymmetric information where the purchaser chooses to observe the
treatments provided but does not observe the patient￿s type nor the health status
improvement due to treatment. The payment to the hospital is a function of treat-
ment, and the contract oﬀered to the hospital is {pgt,pbt,x gt,xbt}. If the purchaser
were to oﬀer the hospital the ￿rst best payments pg = c(x∗
g,φg),p b = c(x∗
b,φb) the
hospital would have an incentive to misrepresent a type φg as a type φb because whilst
it will receive a lower price, it will incur a substantially lower cost and thus earn a
rent of
£
pb − c
¡
x∗
b,φg
¢
> 0
⁄
. Anticipating these incentives, the optimal contract is
14the solution to the purchaser￿s problem Pt written below.
max
£
n(ﬂ x)
'
π
¡
b(xgt,φg) − pgt
¢
+( 1− π)(b(xbt,φb) − pbt)
“⁄
subject to (6)
n(ﬂ x(xgt,x bt))
£
pgt − c(xgt,φg)
⁄
≥ n(ﬂ x(xbt,x bt))
£
pbt − c(xbt,φg)
⁄
, (7)
pbt − c(xbt,φb) ≥ 0. (8)
The ￿rst constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint for a good type. It
ensures that the hospital cannot gain by treating good type patients as if they were
bad. The second constraint is the individual rationality constraint applying to bad
type patients. There are two other constraints: the incentive constraint for a bad
type, and individual rationality constraint for a good type. Neither are included in
the de￿nition of Pt because, as is typical in models of this type, they are not binding
in equilibrium. It can be easily veri￿ed that the optimal contract satis￿es the omitted
c o n s t r a i n t sa si n e q u a l i t i e s .
The two constraints (7) and (8) will hold with equality since the payment to the
hospital can otherwise be lowered to the purchaser￿s bene￿t .T h el e f th a n ds i d eo f( 7 )
measures the total rent that the hospital will earn under a treatment-based payment.
Substituting from (8) into the right hand side of (7) and imposing equality, we can
obtain an expression for this rent20 as:
Rt(xbt)=n(ﬂ x(xbt,x bt))
£
c(xbt,φb) − c(xbt,φg)
⁄
, (9)
> 0.
20The inequality requires xbt > 0, but that will be true in equilibrium.
15In the solution21 of the second best problem the purchaser must pay the hospital
transfers which exceed the cost of treatment in order to ensure that the hospital
has an incentive to oﬀer appropriate treatments to each type of patient. The net
value of these transfers is given by (9). The following proposition makes precise
which patients a hospital will earn rents on, and the implications of these rents for
treatment intensities. In the proposition and subsequently, we use￿ • to denote second
best treatment intensities.
Proposition 1 The hospital receives rent from treating good type patients but none
for treating bad types. There is under-provision of treatment intensity for bad types i.e.
￿ xbt <x ∗
b, and good types always receive higher intensity than bad types i.e. ￿ xgt > ￿ xbt.
It is ambiguous whether there will be over or under-provision of treatment intensity
(relative to the ￿rst-best) for good types.
Proof. In appendix
The nature of the distortions in treatment intensities can be understood by ex-
amining the eﬀect of xbt on the expected rent R(xbt).S i n c e t h e c o s t d i ﬀerential
£
c(xbt,φb) − c(xbt,φg)
⁄
increases with xbt, the expected rent increases with xbt. There-
fore, the purchaser will want to lower xbt from the ￿rst best amount in order to reduce
expected rent. Under-provision of treatment to the bad type is a standard result,
and if it were not for a demand eﬀect, we would also have the standard result that
xg is ￿rst best. However, changes in xb aﬀect the choice of xg via n(•), and this
eﬀect is ambiguous in general. Interestingly, a reduction in xb from x∗
b can result in
an increase in xgt above the ￿rst best level even though Rt(.) is independent of xgt.
21To ensure a well behaved program under asymmetric information, it is suﬃcient to assume that
n00(.) is small, or not too negative, in addition to assumptions made under full information. This
additional assumption makes rent convex in xb.
16By assumption patients are insulated from the cost of their treatment and, hence,
there is a direct link between treatment intensity and patient welfare. Relative to the
￿rst best, type φb patients are worse-oﬀ under second best treatment-based payment,
but type φg patients may be better-oﬀ or worse-oﬀ. Consider an example where π is
very small. In that case, ￿ xbt is close to but smaller than x∗
b, and we already know from
the analysis of the full-information problem that Wgb(x∗
g,x ∗
b) < 0. Since Wgg < 0 by
assumption, for ￿ xbt close to but smaller than x∗
b, we must have ￿ xgt >x ∗
g. In general,
however, Wgb(.) is ambiguous, and there may be under-provision of intensity, and
h e n c el o w e rw e l f a r ef o rt h eg o o dt y p e s .
Since ￿ xgt > ￿ xbt, demand responsiveness acts as a disciplining device because, as
can be seen from expression (9), as the hospital adjusts treatment so as to elicit
h i g h e rp a y m e n ti tm u s td os oi naw a yt h a tw i l lc a u s ep a t i e n t st oa b s t a i nf r o mb e i n g
treated, which lowers total rent.
5 Outcome-based payment
If the purchaser wishes to base payments on observed outcomes, we assume that
it does not learn patient type nor the treatment provided. Under outcome-based
payment, the purchaser chooses the contract {pgo,pbo,h go,hbo}, where the provider is
paid pko when the observed health gain to a patient is hko, and hko =( xko,φk) for
k = b,g. Given this contract, the provider chooses treatment levels for each patient.
Outcome-based payment imposes a constraint on the treatments that the hospital
must give if it is to misreport patient types but satisfy ex post veri￿cation. Again,
the incentive is to misrepresent a type-φg as a type-φb for both the reason given above
and additionally because in misrepresenting such a patient under outcome monitoring,
the hospital can further economise on treatment and, hence, cost. This can be seen
17as follows: if the hospital wants to misrepresent a good type as bad, it must provide
the type-φg with an intensity of treatment such that the expected health gain is the
same as if the patient was type-φb. Speci￿cally, this intensity of treatment is
￿ xbo =￿ x(xbo,φg,φb), (10)
de￿ned by
h(xbo,φb)
def = h(￿ xbo,φg). (11)
In other words, a type-φg n e e d st ob eg i v e nat r e a t m e n t￿ xbo <x bo to generate an ex-
pected health gain equal to the level relevant for a type-φb patient. This is illustrated
in Figure 1.
Even though treatment levels are not observable, the purchaser will anticipate the
incentive of the provider and choose the contract to solve the problem Po given by.
max
£
n(ﬂ x)
'
π
¡
b(xgo,φg) − pgo
¢
+( 1− π)(b(xbo,φb) − pbo)
“⁄
subject to
n(ﬂ x(xgo,x bo))
£
pgo − c(xgo,φg)
⁄
≥ n(ﬂ x(￿ xbo,x bo))
£
pbo − c(￿ xbo,φg)
⁄
, (12)
pbo − c(xbo,φb) ≥ 0, (13)
As in the previous section, the ￿rst constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint
for a good type, and the second is the individual rationality constraint when the type
is bad. Also as previously, the other incentive constraint and individual rationality
constraint, which are satis￿ed as inequalities in equilibrium, are omitted.
The two constraints must be binding, otherwise the purchaser can lower pgo and
pbo to his bene￿t. Applying the same method as used in the section on treatment-
18based payment the rent the hospital will earn under a second best outcome-based
contract can be written
Ro(xbo)=n(ﬂ x(￿ xbo,x bo))
£
c(xbo,φb) − c(￿ xbo,φg)
⁄
, (14)
> 0.
.
Proposition 2 The hospital receives rent from treating good type patients but none
for treating bad types. There is under-provision of treatment intensity for bad types i.e.
￿ xbo <x ∗
b, and good types always receive higher intensity than bad types i.e. ￿ xgo > ￿ xbo.
It is ambiguous whether there will be over or under-provision of treatment intensity
(relative to the ￿rst-best) for good types.
Proof. In appendix.
The explanation of this proposition follows that given in the case of treatment-
based payment.
6 Outcome-based payment makes better use of pa-
tients￿ demand response
Under both the payment systems discussed above, the purchaser pays the hospital
a rent on account of asymmetric information. The diﬀerent payment schemes have
diﬀerent implications for the treatments that patients receive but there is always
under-treatment for bad types relative to the ￿rst best and may be either under- or
over-treatment of good types. The precise extent of the distortions that arise from
information asymmetry will vary according to functional form and parameters. Here
19we are concerned with the relative cost to the purchaser of adopting treatment or
outcome-based payments as that is measured in the rent required to implement a
particular set of treatment intensities. Speci￿cally we are concerned with knowing
whether one form of payment system dominates the other. The following proposition
provides the details.
Proposition 3 For any pair of treatment intensities (xg,x b) that are to be imple-
mented under treatment-based payment, outcome-based payment will implement those
intensities at a lower overall cost to the purchaser if: n(ﬂ x(xb,x b))
£
c(xb,φb) − c(xb,φg)
⁄
>
n(ﬂ x(￿ xb,x b))
£
c(xb,φb) − c(￿ xb,φg)
⁄
, where ￿ xb is obtained by substituting xb for xbo in
(10).
Proof. Consider the pair of treatment intensities (xg,x b) t h a ta r et ob ei m p l e m e n t e d
under treatment-based payment, and de￿ne by the pair (pgt,p bt) the minimum trans-
fers needed to implement them. Using the constraints (8) and (7), we have
pbt = c(xb,φb), (15)
pgt = c(xg,φg)+
n(ﬂ x(xb,x b))
n(ﬂ x(xg,x b))
£
c(xb,φb) − c(xb,φg)
⁄
. (16)
We de￿ne by (pgo,p bo) the pair of (minimum) transfers that implement the pair
of intensities (xg,x b) under outcome based payment. They satisfy
pbo = c(xb,φb), (17)
pgo = c(xg,φg)+
n(ﬂ x(￿ xb,x b))
n(ﬂ x(xg,x b))
£
c(xb,φb) − c(￿ xb,φg)
⁄
. (18)
20Since pbt = pbo, we only need to show that pgt >p go, which is equivalent to the
condition
n(ﬂ x(xb,x b))
£
c(xb,φb) − c(xb,φg)
⁄
>n (ﬂ x(￿ xb,x b))
£
c(xb,φb) − c(￿ xb,φg)
⁄
. (19)
The result follows from a comparison of rents under the two payment schemes.
Rents in both treatment and outcome-based cases have similar features. In both
cases the cost diﬀerential of providing treatment to a good type and receiving reim-
bursement as if the type was bad, and the drop in demand due to lower treatment
intensity ￿gure as determinants of rent. There are, however, signi￿cant diﬀerences.
Since with outcome-based payment, xb is larger than ￿ xb(xb,φb,φg), the cost diﬀeren-
tial is larger in this case, but the drop in demand is also larger. These diﬀerences
will be greater the larger is the discrepancy between xb and b xb and the greater is
the discrepancy in the marginal cost of treatment intensity. Figure 2 shows that rent
per person under outcome-based payment, shown as Ro
n , is larger than that under
treatment-based payment, shown as Rt
n . Whilst the per person rent is higher un-
der outcome-based payment the number of patients determining total rent is lower
by an extent that depends upon demand responsiveness. Hence greater demand re-
sponsiveness reduces rent under outcome-based payment relative to treatment-based
payment. Intuitively, if demand responsiveness is strong enough, the purchaser will
prefer an outcome-based system over a treatment-based one.
The condition in Proposition 3 depends on three things. The extent of the diﬀer-
ence between the outcome of treatment to good and bad types determines the extent
to which xb is greater than ￿ xb. The responsiveness of demand to variations in average
treatment intensity determines, for any given diﬀerence between ￿ xb and xb, the extent
21to which n(ﬂ x(xb,x b)) is greater than n(ﬂ x(￿ xb,x b)). Finally, the curvature of the good
type￿s cost function determines the magnitude of
c(xb,φb) − c(xb,φg) <c (xb,φb) − c(￿ xb,φg).
The interaction between these three eﬀects is complex. However, when there is a
negligible impact of variations in treatment intensity of good types on the cost asso-
ciated with their treatment, the condition is almost certainly satis￿ed. We therefore,
have as a limiting case:
Corollary 4 If cx(x,φg)=0(for all x) outcome-based payment results in a lower
overall cost to the purchaser than treatment-based payment.
Proof. Follows from (19) by using xb > ￿ xb and cx(x,φg)=0(for all x).
It is also possible to consider circumstances under which the condition will not be
satis￿ed. The most obvious case being where average treatment intensity does not
impact on demand. Therefore,
Corollary 5 If n0(.) ≡ 0 and cx(x,φg) > 0, the cost to the purchaser of treatment-
based payment is lower than the cost of outcome-based payment.
Proof. Follows from (19) by setting n(ﬂ x(xb,x b)=n(ﬂ x(￿ xb,x b)).
These results indicate in what ways diﬀerences in demand and cost will in￿u-
ence the optimal form of payment by purchasers. Diﬀerent medical conditions vary
both in the extent to which patients are aware of the treatment they will receive and
the extent to which patients can be expected to respond to variations in treatment,
and will be characterized by diﬀerent marginal costs of treatment intensity. Where
patients perceive and respond to intensity of treatment, as is likely to be the case
22for elective procedures, the analysis suggests that even if purchasers are equipped
with a detailed knowledge of what treatments are eﬀective for each medical condi-
tion they may still wish to monitor the eﬀectiveness of treatment for themselves and
condition payment on what they observe. For medical conditions such as, for exam-
ple, emergency treatments, where there is little exercise of choice by patients (and,
hence n0(.) ≈ 0) the analysis indicates that purchasers will do better by conditioning
payment on the treatments given.
7A l t r u i s m
The analysis above assumes that the hospital maximizes pro￿tw h e r e a st h e r ei se m -
pirical evidence, such as that presented by Dranove and White (1994), which indicates
hospitals may be motivated by a concern for the patients that they treat. In a not-for-
pro￿t hospital it has been argued that treatment intensity may be of intrinsic concern
to the supplier ￿ see, for example, Newhouse (1970). We capture the potential con-
cern that a hospital might have for its patients by considering the hospital as having
an altruistic component to its objective function of A(x,φ)=a(h(x,φ)), where a(h)
is the hospital￿s valuation of h. The main result we obtain is that altruism will bias
the purchaser towards outcomes-based payments.
The formulation of altruism that we use presumes that there is a limit on the
ability of a hospital to ￿nance the treatments it provides out of the altruistic bene￿t
it enjoys22. If that were not the case, the purchaser could rely on the goodwill of the
hospital to ensure that treatments were carried out without the need for payment. We
22This is a similar formulation to Chone and Ma (2004) and Jack (2003). Jack (2003) studies
the eﬀect of private information regarding altruism on cost-reducing eﬀort and quality choice and
derives optimal cost sharing schemes. Chone and Ma (2004) show that private information regarding
altruistic bene￿t can lead to pooling of patient types.
23assume that A(x,φ) is such that the prices pg and pb remain positive in equilibrium.
Under full information, the eﬀect of altruism is to improve the purchaser￿s welfare
because by relying on the hospital￿s concern for its patients, the purchaser can reduce
its payment to the hospital. The purchaser￿s objective function continues to be given
by (1) whilst the individual rationality constraints IRg and IRb need to be modi￿ed
to re￿ect the fact that the prices pg and pb d on o th a v et oc o v e rt h ee n t i r ec o s to f
treatment. Therefore, the constraints become
pi − c(xi,φi)+A(xi,φi) ≥ 0, (IRA
i )
for i = g,b. Since these constraints are binding, purchasers can take full advantage
of a hospital￿s altruism and reduce the payment for each type by the full amount
of altruistic bene￿t A(xi,φi). This implies that full-information treatment intensities
will be higher under altruism.
Under asymmetric information, it is notable that the hospital￿s altruistic bene￿ti s
private information and therefore provides a source of informational rent. This means
that the purchaser may not be able to take as full an advantage of the hospital￿s
altruism as it can under full information. So, whilst the optimal treatment intensities
can be higher, the incentive to misrepresent patient types for a given pair of treatment
intensities may also be higher.
We introduce the incentive constraints, but as before, only the individual rational-
ity constraint for the bad type IRA
b and the incentive compatibility constraint for the
good type ICA
g are binding. We write the two binding constraints for treatment-based
24payments ￿rst,
n(ﬂ x(xgt,x bt))[pgt − c(xgt,φg)+A(xg,φg)]
= n(ﬂ x(xbt,x bt))
£
pbt − c(xbt,φg)+A(xbt,φg)
⁄
(ICA
gt)
pbt − c(xbt,φb)+A(xbt,φb)=0 , (IRA
bt)
and then the same two binding constraints for outcomes-based payments,
n(ﬂ x(xgo,x bo))[pgo − c(xgo,φg)+A(xgo,φg)]
= n(ﬂ x(￿ xbo,x bo))
£
pbo − c(￿ xbo,φg)+A(￿ xbo,φg)
⁄
, (ICA
go)
pbo − c(xbo,φb)+A(xbo,φb)=0 . (IRA
bo)
From these, we can compute the rent under the two schemes to be
R
A
t (xbt)=n(ﬂ x(xbt,x bt))
£¡
c(xbt,φb) − c(xbt,φg)
¢
+
¡
A(xbt,φg) − A(xbt,φb
¢⁄
, (RA
t )
and
R
A
o (xbo)=n(ﬂ x(￿ xbo,x bo))
£¡
c(xbo,φb) − c(￿ xbo,φg)
¢
+
¡
A(￿ xbo,φg) − A(xbo,φb
¢⁄
. (RA
o )
Under treatment-based payment, the rent from altruism,
¡
A(xbt,φg) − A(xbt,φb
¢
, is
positive indicating that the purchaser cannot take as full advantage of the hospital￿s
altruism as it can under full information. However, under outcomes-based payment,
the the rent expression,
¡
A(￿ xbo,φg) − A(xbo,φb
¢
=0since h(￿ xbo,φg) − h(xbo,φb).
This implies that the analogous condition to (19), which establishes the superiority
of outcomes-based schemes, is going to be less stringent in the presence of altruism.
25We conclude that altruism will bias the purchaser towards outcomes-based pay-
m e n t s . S i n c ea l t r u i s t i cb e n e ￿t is derived from the patient￿s health gain, outcomes
monitoring constrains the hospital in bene￿ting from altruism.
This can also be seen formally by repeating the steps of the proof of proposition
3 and comparing the analogous expressions for the minimum payments pgt and pgo
that implement an identical pair of treatment intensities, xg and xb, under the two
payment schemes. In these expressions, the only new parts due to altruism are the
two rent terms
¡
A(xb,φg) − A(xb,φb
¢
) for pgt and
¡
A(￿ xb,φg) − A(xb,φb
¢
) for pgo. It is
immediately clear that the pgo will be reduced relative to pgt w h e nt h e r ei sa l t r u i s m .
8D i s c u s s i o n
Third party purchasers of health service seeking to minimize cost must design pur-
chasing arrangements to make use of all available information. In spite of being pos-
sibly ill-informed about their health status and insulated from the costs of services,
patients have an important role to play in this process as a disciplining device that
can be exploited by purchasers. In this paper we have demonstrated that monitoring
schemes diﬀer in their eﬀectiveness in utilizing patients as a disciplining device and
shown that the choice of the monitoring instrument may itself depend on the strength
of patients￿ demand response to variations in quality of service. We have developed
a framework for assessing two fundamental ways of calculating payments: one based
on treatments (input measures), and one based on health outcomes (improvement
in health status). We have shown that when demand is particularly responsive to
quality of service, payment schemes based on outcome reduce the overall cost to the
purchaser relative to payment schemes based on treatment. We show that this is
because payment based on outcomes makes misrepresentation of patient-type more
26costly to a supplier in terms of a demand eﬀect, since services will have to be tailored
to patient-type such that the outcome is consistent with what is claimed. We have
extended the analysis to consider the impact of service providers who have an intrinsic
concern for patients and are, thus, altruistic. The obvious eﬀe c ti st h a tt h ep u r c h a s e r
can reduce payment to suppliers to take advantage of their altruism. Asymmetric
information, however, prevents purchasers from exploiting altruism fully. Closer to
the focus the paper, altruism biases purchasers towards outcome-based payments be-
cause misrepresentation hurts patients more under outcome-based payments and this
impacts upon the supplier￿s utility.
The outcomes movement seeks to clarify what are appropriate treatments for
diﬀerent medical conditions by means of measuring the bene￿ts from treatments and
thus extends the information available to the purchasers of health care. In practice it
seems likely that there will always be greater uncertainty associated with measuring
outcome, where the object of analysis is an individual￿s health status, than with
measuring treatment and thus that conditioning payment upon outcomes is inherently
risky. Nevertheless, there is considerable ongoing investment in acquiring more and
better outcomes information and our analysis indicates how this extra information
might be used and, in particular, that there is a bene￿t to directly incorporating
it into the payment of health care providers when, as is true for some conditions,
patients actively choose whether to be treated according to the quality of service
that they expect to receive. When hospitals are altruistic our analysis indicates that
outcomes based payment is also more likely. Hence, according to both the type of
health service being provided and the objectives of the provider, diﬀerent purchasing
arrangements are appropriate.
Insights from this analysis are applicable in other settings where third party pur-
27chasing occurs and clients do not clearly observe bene￿ts received. Besides markets
where insurance is important, third party purchasing also frequently occurs where
public provision is undertaken and users of services are insulated, perhaps for reasons
of equity, from the direct costs of the services they consume. In the UK many of
the services that in the US are included under health care are termed social services
and are provided on this basis. In both the UK (Legal Aid) and the US (public
defenders) legal services are provided by the state also on this basis. Our ￿ndings
suggest that input based payments will be more eﬀective where demand results from
an emergency, while outcome based payments may be more attractive in situations
w h e r ec o n s u m e r sa r em o r ef r e et oe x e r c i s ec h o i c e .
Appendix
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1
Proof. The result on rents follow from the binding constraints (7) and (8). Using
the de￿nitions of S(.) from (2), rent from (9), and the fact that (7) and (8) hold as
equalities, we can rewrite the purchaser￿s problem as the unconstrained problem,
max
xgt,xbt
[n(ﬂ x(xgt,x bt))S(xgt,x bt) − πRt(xbt)], (20)
or, by the de￿nition of W(.) from (3),
max
xgt,xbt
[W(xgt,x bt) − πRt(xbt)].
28The ￿rst order conditions de￿ning the optimal choices can be written,
Wg(￿ xgt, ￿ xbt)=0 , (21)
Wb(￿ xgt, ￿ xbt) − πR
0
t(￿ xbt)=0 (22)
where, using￿ • to denote a function or derivative evaluated at the second best choices
of treatment intensities ￿ xgt, ￿ xbt,w eh a v e
Wg(xgt,x bt)=￿ n
0π￿ S + π￿ n
¡
bx(￿ xgt,φg) − cx(￿ xgt,φg)
¢
,
Wb(xgt,x bt)=￿ n
0(1 − π)￿ S +￿ n(1 − π)(bx(￿ xbt,φb) − cx(￿ xbt,φb)).
Condition (21) implies that bx(￿ xgt,φg) − cx(￿ xgt,φg) < 0, and we know from the de-
￿nition of Rt(.) that R0
t(￿ xbt) > 0 since n(ﬂ x(xbt,x bt)) and
£
c(￿ xbt,φb) − c(￿ xbt,φg)
⁄
are
both increasing in xbt.
I) ￿ xbt < ￿ xgt : The ￿rst order conditions (21) and (22) together imply that
¡
bx(￿ xgt,φg) − cx(￿ xgt,φg)
¢
=( bx(￿ xbt,φb) − cx(￿ xbt,φb)) −
π
￿ n(1 − π)
R
0
t(￿ xbt)
< (bx(￿ xbt,φb) − cx(￿ xbt,φb)).
Therefore, ￿ xgt > ￿ xbt since (a) bx(￿ xgt,φg)−cx(￿ xgt,φg) < 0, (b) bxx(.)−cxx(.) < 0, and
(c)
¡
bx(x,φg) − cx(x,φg)
¢
> (bx(x,φb) − cx(x,φb)) for all x.
II) ￿ xbt <x ∗
b : Consider a small change (dxgt,dx bt) and evaluate the objective
function near the ￿rst best. Since Wg(x∗
g,x ∗
b)=Wb(x∗
g,x ∗
b)=0 , and R0
t(￿ xbt) > 0, the
value of the objective function decreases with xbt at (x∗
g,x ∗
b). Therefore, ￿ xbt <x ∗
b.
III) We cannot determine whether ￿ xgt >o r<x ∗
g because the sign of the cross
29partial derivative Wgb is ambiguous in general.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n2
Proof. The result on rents follows from the binding constraints (12) and (13). Using
the de￿nitions of S(.) from (2) rent from (9), and the fact that (12) and (13) hold as
equalities, we can rewrite the purchaser￿s problem as the unconstrained problem,
max
xgo,xbo
[n(ﬂ x(xgo,x bo))S(xgo,x bo) − πRo(xbo)], (23)
or, by the de￿nition of W(.) from (3),
max
xgo,xbo
[W(xgo,x bo) − πRo(xbo)]
The ￿rst order conditions de￿ning the optimal choices can be written,
Wg(￿ xgo, ￿ xbo)=0 , (24)
Wb(￿ xgo, ￿ xbo) − πR
0
o(￿ xbo)=0 (25)
The rest of the proof follows that of proposition 1. However,it is useful to note that
there is an additional complication in the case of outcome-based payment, which is
∂c(￿ xbo,φg)
∂xbo
= cx(￿ xbo,φg)
bx(xbo,φb)
bx(￿ xbo,φg)
<c x(￿ xbo,φg).
This implies that Ro(.) is larger and increases faster than Rt(.) for each xb.
30Multiple types
We sketch the arguments needed to show that the extension of our model to multiple
types may be tedious, but is not problemat i c . L e tu sc o n s i d e ram o d e lw i t h ,t h r e e
types such that φ ∈ {φg,φm,φb} and the respective probabilities for φi are πi,i=
b,m,g. The arguments generalize to the case of n types in a straightforward manner.
The binding IR constraint is IRb and the binding incentive constraints are for the
hospital claiming a good type to be medium and a medium type to be bad. The
binding ICg constraints for the good type under the two schemes are respectively
ICgt and ICgo:
n(x(xbt,x mt,x gt))
£
pgt − c(xgt,φg)
⁄
=
n(x(xbt,x mt,x mt))
£
pmt − c(xmt,φg)
⁄
,
n(x(xbo,x mo,x go))
£
pgo − c(xgo,φg)
⁄
=
n(x(xbo,x mo, ￿ xmo))
£
pmo − c(￿ xmo,φg)
⁄
,
and the binding ICm constraints for the medium type under the two schemes are
respectively ICmt and ICmo:
n(x(xbt,x mt,x gt))[pmt − c(xmt,φm)] =
n(x(xbt,x bt,x gt))[pbt − c(xbt,φm)],
n(x(xbo,x mo,x go))[pmo − c(xmo,φm)] =
n(x(xbo, ￿ xbo,x go))[pbo − c(￿ xbo,φm)],
31while the binding IR constraints for the bad type under the two schemes respectively
are IRbt and IRbo:
pbt − c(xbt,φb)=0 ,
pbo − c(xbo,φb)=0 .
From these expressions we can compute rents for the medium type as follows:
Rmt(xbt,x gt)=n(x(xbt,x bt,x gt))[c(xbt,φb) − c(xbt,φm)], (Rmt)
Rmo(xbo,x go)=n(x(xbo, ￿ xbo,x go))[c(xbo,φb) − c(￿ xbo,φm)]. (Rmo)
I nt h ep r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 ,w ee s s e n t i a l l yc o m p a r et h er e n t su n d e rt h et w os c h e m e s
for identical treatment intensities. So, we could rewrite the above to be implementing
the intensities {xb,x m,x g} i nb o t hc a s e sa n dc o m p a r et h er e n t .B u ti ti so b v i o u st h a t ,
comparing the rents of the medium type is identical to comparing the rents for the
good type in a two-type case, and the same results as in the paper will follow. The
cost diﬀerential in the square brackets is larger for outcomes-based payments, while
the demand n is smaller. So, we move on to compare the rents for the good type in
the current three-type model, but before that we need the prices for medium type
under treatment and outcomes-based schemes respectively. In obvious notation these
are pmt and pmo :
pmt =
Rmt(xb,x g)
n(x(xb,x m,x g))
+ c(xm,φm),
pmo =
Rmo(xb,x g)
n(x(xb,x m,x g))
+ c(xm,φm),
where we have used identical intensities for both schemes. Using these computed
32prices in the ICg equations, we then get the rent expressions for the good type.
Rgt = n(x(xb,x m,x m))
∙
Rmt(xb,x g)
n(x(xb,x m,x g))
+ c(xmt,φm) − c(xm,φg)
‚
,
Rgo = n(x(xb,x m, ￿ xm))
∙
Rmo(xb,x g)
n(x(xb,x m,x g))
+ c(xm,φm) − c(￿ xm,φg)
‚
.
Again, when n0 ≈ 0, (i.e., n is almost a constant) these imply that Rgt <R go since
then Rmo >R mt and we know that
¡
c(xm,φm) − c(￿ xm,φg)
¢
>
¡
c(xm,φm) − c(xm,φg)
¢
because ￿ xm <x m. For a high enough n0, t h eo p p o s i t ei st r u e . T h ec o s te x p r e s -
sions are not aﬀected by n0and neither are the denominators n(x(xb,x m,x g)). But
[n(x(xb,x m,x m)) − n(x(xb,x m, ￿ xm))] increases and we know from above that Rmt >
Rmo for n0 high enough.
Hence the analysis in the paper generalizes in a natural way to three types and,
by a recursion argument, to n types.
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Figure 1: Treatment under outcome-based payment
n
Rt
n
Ro
cx b (, ) φ
cx g (, ) φ pb 
b x ￿ b x
x  
Figure 2: Rent per person under treatment and outcome-based payments.
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